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Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth
Abstract
??We analyze an economy where firms undertake both innovation and adoption of technologies from
the world technology frontier. The selection of high-skill managers and firms is more important for
innovation than for adoption. As the economy approaches the frontier, selection becomes more
important. Countries at early stages of development pursue an investment-based strategy, which relies
on existing firms and managers to maximize investment but sacrifices selection. Closer to the world
technology frontier, economies switch to an innovation-based strategy with short-term relationships,
younger firms, less investment, and better selection of firms and managers. We show that relatively
backward economies may switch out of the investment-based strategy too soon, so certain policies such
as limits on product market competition or investment subsidies, which encourage the investment-based
strategy, may be beneficial. However, these policies may have significant long-run costs because they
make it more likely that a society will be trapped in the investment-based strategy and fail to converge
to the world technology frontier.
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We analyze an economy where firms undertake both innovation and
adoption of technologies from the world technology frontier. The selection
of high-skill managers and firms is more important for innovation than for
adoption. As the economy approaches the frontier, selection becomes more
important. Countries at early stages of development pursue an investment-
based strategy, which relies on existing firms and managers to maximize
investment but sacrifices selection. Closer to the world technology fron-
tier, economies switch to an innovation-based strategy with short-term re-
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In a number of important historical instances industrialization processes,
when launched at length in a backward country, showed considerable
diﬀerences with more advanced countries, not only with regard to
the speed of development (the rate of industrial growth) but also
with regards to the productive and organizational structures of in-
dustry... These diﬀerences in the speed and character of industrial
development were to a considerable extent the result of application of
institutional instruments for which there was little or no counterpart
in an established industrial country.
Gerschenkron (1962, p. 7)
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In his famous essay, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Ger-
schenkron argued that relatively backward economies such as Germany, France,
and Russia during the nineteenth century could rapidly catch up to more ad-
vanced economies by undertaking large investments and adopting frontier tech-
nologies. He emphasized that certain “non competitive” arrangements, including
long-term relationships between ﬁrms and banks, as well as large ﬁrms and state
intervention might facilitate such convergence. If this assessment is correct then
the institutions and policies that are appropriate to relatively backward nations
should encourage investment and technology adoption, even if this comes at the
expense of various market rigidities and a less competitive environment. Implicit
in this argument, and in the use of the term “appropriate”, is also the notion
that such arrangements are not beneﬁcial for more advanced economies.
In this paper, we construct a simple endogenous growth model where certain
relatively rigid arrangements emerge in equilibrium at early stages of development
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and disappear as the economy approaches the world technology frontier. We also
use this framework to investigate how certain policies that might initially increase
growth and the speed of convergence could then lead to slower growth.
To understand the main mechanism in our model, imagine a stylized economy
with three key features: (i) entrepreneurs are either high skill or low skill; (ii)
there are credit constraints restricting the amount of investment; and (iii) entre-
preneurs engage both in innovation and adoption of existing technologies from
the world technology frontier. If an entrepreneur is successful and is revealed
to be high skill, he will continue to operate. If he is revealed to be low skill,
the ﬁrm can dismiss him and replace him by a new draw, who will on average
have higher skills. However, because of credit-market imperfections, the retained
earnings of insider entrepreneurs enable them to undertake greater investments.
Consequently, the decision to retain unsuccessful entrepreneurs creates a trade-oﬀ
between investment and selection.
It is also plausible that skills (or match quality between ﬁrms and their ac-
tivities) and the selection of the right entrepreneurs are more important for in-
novation than for adoption of existing technologies: adoption and imitation are
relatively straightforward activities compared to innovation. This leads to a key
implication of our model: retaining unsuccessful entrepreneurs is more costly,
and less likely to arise in equilibrium, when innovation is more important. A
corollary is that, as an economy approaches the world technology frontier and
there remains less room for adoption and imitation, retention of unsuccessful
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entrepreneurs becomes less likely.
A likely equilibrium sequence is for an economy to start with an investment-
based strategy, relying on long-term relationships between entrepreneurs (or man-
agers) and ﬁrms (or ﬁnanciers) in order to maximize investment. Intuitively, this
strategy corresponds to an equilibrium where selection is less important, insiders
are protected, and savings are channeled through existing ﬁrms in an attempt
to achieve rapid investment growth and technology adoption. As the economy
approaches the world technology frontier, lack of selection becomes more costly
and there is typically a switch to an innovation-based strategy, where contracts
with less successful entrepreneurs are terminated.
Furthermore, as suggested by Gerschenkron, government intervention to en-
courage the investment-based strategy might be useful because that strategy may
otherwise fail to emerge even when it would be good for growth or welfare. This
is due to the standard appropriability eﬀect in models with monopolistic competi-
tion (as in most endogenous technical change models): greater investment leads
to greater productivity and output, but monopolists appropriate only part of
these gains while bearing the investment costs in full. This creates a bias against
large investments and hence against the investment-based strategy. Investment
subsidies or anticompetitive policies which increase the amount of the produc-
tivity gains that monopolists can appropriate encourage the investment-based
strategy and may increase the equilibrium growth rate.
Nevertheless, our analysis also reveals that the investment-based strategy
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can be socially costly in the long run. Countering the appropriability eﬀect is
the rent-shield eﬀect : the cash (rents) in the hands of insiders creates a shield
that protects them from more eﬃcient newcomers. This eﬀect can outweigh the
appropriability eﬀect and imply that an economy may stay in the investment-
based strategy too long. Delayed switch to the innovation-based strategy reduces
growth because the economy is not making best use of innovation opportunities.
More important, there exists a level of development (distance to frontier) such
that, if an economy does not switch out of the investment-based strategy before
this threshold, it will be stuck in a non convergence trap where convergence to
the frontier stops.
An implication of this discussion is a new theory of leapfrogging. Economies
pursuing policies encouraging the investment-based strategy may initially grow
faster than others, but become then stuck in a non convergence trap and be
leapfrogged by the initial laggards. This is a diﬀerent view of leapfrogging from
the standard approach (e.g. Brezis et al. 1994), which is based on comparative
advantage and learning-by-doing.
This analysis raises another important question: Why do governments not
choose institutions and policies that favor the investment-based strategy when
the country is in its early stages of development and then switch to policies sup-
porting innovation and selection as the country approaches the frontier? The
answer lies in the political economy of government intervention. Policies that fa-
vor the investment-based strategy create and enrich their own supporters. When
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economic power buys political power, it becomes diﬃcult to reverse policies that
have an economically and politically powerful constituency. Consequently, soci-
eties may remain trapped with “inappropriate institutions” and relatively back-
ward technologies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some moti-
vating evidence and discusses the related literature. Section 3 outlines the basic
model, and Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 5 discusses govern-
ment policy and the possibility of political economy traps. Section 6 concludes.
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The main assumption of our analysis is that innovation and selection become
more important as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. We
ﬁrst investigate the plausibility of this assumption by looking at the correlation
between distance to frontier and research and development (R&D) intensity at the
industry level using data from the OECD sectoral database previously analyzed
by (among others) Griﬃth et al. (2004).
A natural (inverse) proxy for distance to frontier is “proximity to frontier”
for an industry, PTFict, deﬁned as TFP (total factor productivity) in industry i
in country c at time t divided by the highest TFP in industry i at time t in the
sample. We obtain estimates of proximity to frontier as well as data on R&D
5
intensity, RDict (R&D divided by sales) for the years 1974—1990.
1
Table 1 reports the correlation between these two measures with or without
controlling for country and industry eﬀects. The ﬁrst three columns use a measure
of PTFict without correcting for diﬀerences in skills and hours, while the last
three columns use a measure that corrects for these diﬀerences (see Griﬃth et al.
2004). All columns show the same pattern of a statistically signiﬁcant positive
correlation between proximity to frontier and R&D intensity: industries closer
to their respective frontier are more R&D intensive. Moreover, as an industry
approaches the world technology frontier more rapidly than others it becomes
relatively more R&D intensive.
Naturally, these regressions do not show a causal eﬀect of distance to frontier
on R&D (e.g. past investments in R&D will aﬀect productivity and distance to
the frontier). Nevertheless, they are consistent with the view that R&D is more
important in industries or countries closer to the world technology frontier.
TABLE 1
Our analysis also implies that barriers to competition should have limited
costs (or even beneﬁts) when countries are far from the world technology frontier
but should become much more costly near the frontier. Although this implication
appears to be consistent with the experiences of many Latin American countries
1We are grateful to Rachel Griﬃth for providing us with these data and for generous help
with the empirical evidence presented here. See Griﬃth et al. (2004) for the construction of
all the variables used here, descriptive statistics, and details.
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as well as with those of Korea and Japan,2 we are not aware of any systematic
empirical investigation. To take a ﬁrst step in this direction, we consider a sample
of non-OECD countries including those that joined the OECD in the 1990s, such
as Korea and Mexico, but excluding former socialist countries. The sample is
chosen so as to approximate “follower” countries, which are signiﬁcantly behind
the world technology frontier and therefore provide us with an opportunity to
investigate convergence patterns.
We split the sample into low-barrier and high-barrier countries according to
the “number of procedures to open a new business” variable from Djankov et
al. (2002); the results are similar using the two other measures of barriers to
entry from Djankov et al.. Countries are classiﬁed into the low-barrier group
if the number of such procedures is smaller or equal to ten and into the high-
barrier group otherwise. This implies that nineteen countries are classiﬁed as
high barrier and twenty-three countries as low barrier.3 The barrier measures
2A number of Latin American countries most notably Brazil, Mexico and Peru, which grew
relatively rapidly with import substitution and protectionist policies until the mid-1970s, stag-
nated and were taken over by other economies with relatively more competitive policies, such
as Hong Kong or Singapore. The experiences of Korea and Japan are also consistent with this
story. Though in many ways more market friendly than the Latin American countries, for much
of the post-war period both Korea and Japan achieved rapid growth and convergence relying on
high investment, large conglomerates, government subsidies, and relatively protected internal
markets. Convergence and growth came to an end in the mid-1980s in Japan and during the
Asian crisis in Korea (though Korea appears to have adopted a number of important reforms
and resumed growth rapidly after the crisis).
3Our low-barrier group includes: Chile, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Jamaica, Malaysia,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia,
Uruguay, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; the high-barrier group includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, the Philippines, Senegal, Tan-
zania, Uganda, and Venezuela.
The median number of procedures is eleven and four countries have exactly eleven procedures:
Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya and Uganda. The results are robust to classifying these countries into
the low-barrier group.
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are time invariant, and so is our classiﬁcation. Proximity to frontier is deﬁned as
the ratio of the country’s GDP to the U.S. GDP at the beginning of the sample
(from the Penn dataset). For the cross-sectional regressions, per capita GDP
growth rates are for 1965—95, and the initial data are for 1965.
We deﬁne the two dummy variables HB and LB, where HB is equal to 1 for
high-barrier countries and LB takes the value 1 for the low-barrier countries. We
also control for a dummy for sub-Saharan Africa because countries in this region
have experienced much slower growth than the rest of the world during this time
period but we do not think that this is related to the mechanisms emphasized
here (see Acemoglu et al. (2001) on the role of institutions, and see Easterly
and Levine (1997) on the role of ethnolinguistic fragmentation in explaining low
growth in Africa). Thus the estimating equation is:
gi,65−95 = α0,HBLBi + α0,LBLBi
+α1,HB
(
yi,65
yUS,65
HBi
)
+ α1,LB
(
yi,65
yUS,65
LBi
)
+ α2 SAi + εi,
where gi,65−95 is growth in GDP per capita in country i between 1965 and 1995,
yi,65 is GDP per capita in country i in 1965, yUS,65 is GDP per capita in the
United States in 1965, SAi is a dummy for sub-Saharan Africa and HBi and
LBi are the low- and high- barrier dummies deﬁned previously. The coeﬃcients
of interest are the convergence coeﬃcients, α1,HB and α1,LB. A more negative
estimate for α2,LB implies that high-barrier countries do relatively well far from
the frontier but worse closer to the frontier.
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TABLE 2
Column 1 of Table 2 reports the estimates of α1,HB and α1,LB from this cross-
sectional regression, which are also shown as the slope coeﬃcients in Figures 1a
and 1b. As can be seen in these ﬁgures, there is a stronger negative relationship
between proximity to frontier (yi,65/yUS,65) and growth for high-barrier coun-
tries.4 For example, α1,LB is estimated as −0.021 (S.E.=0.030), while α1,HB
is −0.073 (S.E.=0.029). While there is a strong negative relationship between
growth and proximity to frontier for countries with high barriers, the relationship
is much weaker for countries with low barriers. In other words, high-barrier coun-
tries do relatively well (i.e., converge rapidly) when they are far from the frontier
but slow down signiﬁcantly near the frontier, whereas low-barrier countries grow
almost equally successfully near or far from the frontier. This is consistent with
the notion that barriers to entry are more harmful to growth closer to the fron-
tier, although this cross-country relationship may be driven by other omitted
cross-country diﬀerences. Nevertheless, the p-value at the bottom of the table
shows that in this case we cannot reject the hypothesis that these two coeﬃcients
are equal given the standard errors in this cross-sectional regression.
FIGURE 1
The cross-sectional regression does not exploit all of the relevant information,
however, for the implication of our approach is that, at any point in time, there
4The vertical axes in the ﬁgures show country growth rates after the eﬀect of the sub-Saharan
Africa dummy, estimated in the corresponding multivariate regression, is taken out.
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should be a stronger relationship between proximity to frontier and growth for
the high-barrier countries than for the low-barrier countries. To investigate this
issue, we next estimate regressions of the form
gi,t = α0,HBLBi + α0,LBLBi
+α1,HB
(
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
HBi
)
+ α1,LB
(
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
LBi
)
+ α2SAi + ft + εit,
where gi,t is the growth rate in country i between t− 1 and t, yi,t−1 is GDP per
capita in country i at date t− 1, yUS,t−1 is GDP per capita in the United States
at date t− 1, ft denotes a full set of time eﬀects, and we take the time intervals
to be 5 years.5 The results are reported in column 2 and show a similar pattern,
with no relationship between growth and proximity to frontier for low-barrier
countries yet with a strong negative relationship for the high-barrier countries.
For example, α1,LB is now estimated to be 0.009 (S.E.= 0.015), while α1,HB
is −0.061 (S.E.= 0.017). The diﬀerence between these two coeﬃcients is now
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The next column adds controls for years
of schooling (we use male use of schooling from the Barro and Lee dataset), and
the pattern is unchanged.
The patterns shown in columns 1—3 could be driven by some omitted country
characteristics. A stronger test of the implication of our model would be to
see whether growth in high-barrier countries slows down more signiﬁcantly as
they approach the frontier relative to growth in low-barrier countries. In order
5The sample for the ﬁve-year regressions is not balanced, and we extend the sample back to
1960 for some countries. The results are very similar if we start in 1965 for all countries.
10
to investigate this, in column 4 we augment the speciﬁcation to include a full
set of country ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence we are now investigating whether the same
pattern holds when we look at deviations from the country’s “usual” growth
rate. The results conﬁrm the pattern shown in the previous columns: α1,LB
is estimated to be −0.036 (S.E.= 0.036), while α1,HB is estimated at −0.105
(S.E.= 0.046). Figures 1d and 1e show the convergence patterns captured by
these within regressions. Near the frontier, a country with high barriers grows
less than its usual growth rate. Therefore, as implied by our model, countries
with high barriers slow down more signiﬁcantly as they approach the frontier.
But the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients is once again statistically insigniﬁcant.
Nevertheless, the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 are diﬃcult to interpret
because of the standard bias in models with ﬁxed eﬀects and lagged dependent
variables (see e.g. Wooldridge (2002), Chap. 10). Proximity to frontier is corre-
lated with the lags of the dependent variable, since gi,t ≈ (yi,t − yi,t−1) /yi,t. This
creates a bias in the estimation of the ﬁxed eﬀects and therefore in the estimates
of the α1. To deal with this problem, in columns 5 and 6, we report regressions
where proximity to frontier is instrumented by its one-period lag. The results
are similar to those reported in columns 6 and 7: the estimate of α1,LB is −0.033
(S.E.= 0.048), while α1,HB is estimated at −0.206 (S.E.= 0.071). The diﬀerence
between the coeﬃcients α1,HB and α1,LB is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level without years of schooling and at the 1% level with years of schooling in
the regression.
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Finally, in the bottom panel of Table 2 we report regressions that interact
the barrier variable with proximity to frontier:
gi,t = β0 + β1Bi + β2
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
+ β3
(
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
Bi
)
+ di + ft + εit;
here Bi denotes the level of barriers in country i, and β3 is the coeﬃcient of
interest. The results are consistent with those reported in the top panel. The
interaction term β2, which now captures the diﬀerence between α1,HB and α1,LB ,
is estimated to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant (−0.009, with S.E.=0.003).
This again implies that high-barrier countries slow down more the closer they get
to the frontier. Other results, with the exception of those in column 4, also show
a signiﬁcant interaction term.
2.2 R	 L	
	usc

Our paper relates to a number of diﬀerent literatures. First, the notion that skills
are more important for innovation than for adoption is closely related to the role
of human capital in technological progress emphasized in the seminal paper by
Nelson and Phelps (1966), as well as to the emphasis in Galor and Tsiddon (1997)
and Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000) on the importance of ability and skill
in times of economic change and turbulence. Nelson and Phelps, for example,
rank activities by the degree to which they require adaptation to change. They
write: “At the bottom of this scale are functions that are highly routinized....
In the other direction on this scale we have, for example, innovative functions
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which demand keeping abreast of improving technology.” (p. 69). Nelson and
Phelps argue that the importance of human capital increases with the innovative
content of the tasks performed, or with the extent to which it is necessary to
follow and to understand new technological developments.
Second, our focus is related to work on technological convergence, includ-
ing Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998), Zeira
(1998), Howitt (2000) and especially to Howitt and Mayer (2002), who investi-
gate how some countries may stagnate while others converge to an income level
below the world technology frontier.
Third, our model is related to work on ﬁnance and growth, including Green-
wood and Jovanovic (1990), King and Levine (1993), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997). More closely related is Tong and Xu (2004), who extend the model by De-
watripont and Maskin (1995) to compare “multi-ﬁnancier” and “single-ﬁnancier”
credit relationships, emphasizing that multi-ﬁnancier relationships become more
beneﬁcial at later stages of development when selecting good R&D projects be-
comes more important. None of these papers, however, investigate how certain
arrangements that are at ﬁrst growth enhancing can later reduce growth and
cause non convergence traps. The only exception is Rajan and Zingales (1999),
who suggest that the same practices that were useful for the success of East
Asian economies may have also been responsible for the East Asian crisis which
is similar to our argument that certain social arrangements are ﬁrst beneﬁcial
and then become costly. Nevertheless, Rajan and Zingales neither develop this
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point formally nor provide empirical evidence supporting this claim.
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The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of risk-neutral agents,
who live for two-periods and discount the future at the rate r. The population
is constant. Each generation consists of a mass 1/2 of capitalists with prop-
erty rights on “production sites” but with no skills or other wealth, and a mass
(N + 1) /2 of workers who are born with no wealth but are endowed with skills.
Property rights are transmitted within dynasties. All workers supply their labor
inelastically and are equally productive in production tasks, but they have het-
erogeneous productivity in entrepreneurial activities. In particular, we assume
that each worker is a high skill (ability) entrepreneur with probability λ and a
low-skill entrepreneur with probability 1− λ.
There is a unique ﬁnal good in the economy that is also used as an input
to produce intermediate goods. We take this good as the numéraire. The ﬁnal
good is produced competitively using labor and a continuum one of intermediate
goods as inputs with the aggregate production function
yt =
1
α
N1−αt
(∫ 1
0
(At(ν))
1−αxt(ν)
α dν
)
, (1)
where At(ν) is productivity in sector ν at time t, xt(ν) is the ﬂow of intermediate
good ν used in ﬁnal-good production at time t, Nt is the number of production
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workers at time t, and α ∈ (0, 1).
In each intermediate sector ν, one production site has access to the most
productive technology, At(ν), so this “leading ﬁrm” will enjoy monopoly power.
Each leading ﬁrm has access to a technology capable of transforming one unit
of the ﬁnal good into one unit of intermediate good with productivity At(ν).
A fringe of additional ﬁrms can “steal” this technology and produce the same
intermediate good, with the same productivity At(ν), without using the produc-
tion site or an entrepreneur. But this fringe faces higher costs of production and
needs χ units of the ﬁnal good to produce one unit of the intermediate, where
1/α ≥ χ > 1 (naturally, these ﬁrms will not be active in equilibrium). The
parameter χ captures technological factors as well as government regulation af-
fecting entry. A higher χ corresponds to a less competitive market. The fact that
χ > 1 implies that the fringe is less productive than the incumbent producer,
while χ ≤ 1/α implies that this productivity gap is suﬃciently small that the
incumbent will be forced to charge a limit price in order to prevent entry by the
fringe. Naturally, this limit price will be equal to the marginal cost of the fringe,
pt (ν) = χ. (2)
The ﬁnal-good sector is competitive, so each intermediate-good producer ν at
date t faces the inverse demand schedule pt(ν) = (At(ν)Nt/xt(ν))
1−α. This equa-
tion together with (2) gives equilibrium demands: xt(ν) = χ
−(1/(1−α))At(ν)Nt,
15
with equilibrium proﬁts therefore equal to
πt (ν) = (pt (ν)− 1)xt = δAt (ν)Nt; (3)
where δ ≡ (χ− 1)χ−(1/(1−α)) is monotonically increasing in χ (since χ ≤ 1/α).
Thus, a higher δ corresponds to a less competitive market and implies higher
proﬁts for the leading ﬁrms.
Equation (1) gives aggregate output as yt = α
−1χ−(α/(1−α))AtNt, where
At ≡
∫ 1
0
At (ν) dν (4)
is the average level of technology in the economy at time t. The market-clearing
wage level is equal to the marginal product of labor in production:
wt = (1− α)α
−1χ−(α/(1−α))At. (5)
Finally, let ynett , the net output, be ﬁnal output minus the cost of intermediate
production. Then
ynett = yt −
∫ 1
0
xt (ν) dν = ζAtNt, (6)
where ζ ≡ (χ− α)χ−(1/(1−α))/α is monotonically decreasing in χ. Thus for given
average technology At, both total and net output are decreasing in the extent
of monopoly power (i.e., in χ) because of standard monopoly distortions. Note
also that net output, (6), and proﬁts, (3), have identical forms except that net
output has the term ζ instead of δ < ζ. This reﬂects an appropriability eﬀect :
monopolists capture only a fraction of the greater productivity in the ﬁnal-good
sector (or of the consumer surplus) created by their production.
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Each leading ﬁrm (capitalist) requires an entrepreneur (or manager) to operate
the ﬁrm. This leaves Nt = N production workers (recall that the total size of the
worker population is N +1). This implies that πt(ν) = δAt(ν)N for all ν and t.
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Firm productivity is determined by entrepreneurial skill and by the size of the
project that the entrepreneur operates. To simplify the discussion, we assume
that there are two possible project sizes, “small” and “large”. Running a project
requires an additional investment, which is naturally greater for the large project
than for the small project. The investment cost can be ﬁnanced either through
the retained earnings of the entrepreneur or by the capitalist who owns the ﬁrm.
At the beginning of the period, capitalists can borrow from a set of competitive
intermediaries who collect funds from consumers. Intermediation is without any
cost, and there is free entry into this activity. Moreover, since intermediation
takes place within a period, there are no interest costs to be covered.
Entrepreneurial skills, which aﬀect productivity growth, are initially unknown
but are revealed after an agent works as an entrepreneur for the ﬁrst time. En-
trepreneurs perform two important tasks: (i) they engage in innovation, and
entrepreneurial skills are important for success in this activity, (ii) they also
adopt technologies from the frontier, and here skills play a less important role
6This expression shows that proﬁts are increasing in the size of the population, N , and, as
in most models of endogenous growth, this creates a scale eﬀect here. This scale eﬀect plays no
role in any of our results, and we do not emphasize the comparative statics with respect to this
variable. The scale eﬀect can be removed by modifying the model, for example, by introducing
a maximal span of control at the ﬁrm level and by introducing free entry to determine the
number of ﬁrms.
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than in innovation. This assumption captures the notions that relatively back-
ward economies can grow by adopting already well-established technologies, and
that entrepreneurial selection is less important for adoption than for innovation.
Let us denote the growth rate of the world technology frontier, A¯t, by g, so
that
A¯t = A¯0 (1 + g)
t . (7)
We shall return shortly to the determination of this growth rate. All countries
have a state of technology At, as deﬁned by (4), that is less than the frontier
technology. In particular, for the representative country, we have At ≤ A¯t.
The productivity of intermediate good ν at time t is expressed as
At (ν) = st (ν)
(
ηA¯t−1 + γt (ν)At−1
)
; (8)
here st(ν) ∈ {σ, 1} denotes the size of the project, with st(ν) = σ < 1 correspond-
ing to a small project and st(ν) = 1 corresponding to a large project. The term
γt(ν) denotes the skill level of the entrepreneur. Equation (8) captures the two
dimensions of productivity growth: adoption and innovation. By adopting exist-
ing technologies, ﬁrms beneﬁt from the state of world technology in the previous
period, A¯t−1, irrespective of the skill of the entrepreneur. In addition there is
productivity growth due to innovation building on the body of local knowledge,
At−1, and success in innovation depends on entrepreneurial skills as captured
by the term γt (ν). This feature introduces the assumption that entrepreneur-
ial skills are more important for innovation than for imitation; put diﬀerently,
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innovation relies on entrepreneurial selection more than does imitation. Finally,
equation (8) also implies that greater investment (the large project) leads to
higher productivity growth.
Rearranging (8) and using the deﬁnition in (4) yields the growth rate of
aggregate technology
At
At−1
≡
∫ 1
0 At (ν) dν
At−1
=
∫ 1
0
st (ν)
(
η
A¯t−1
At−1
+ γt (ν)
)
dν. (9)
Equation (9) shows the importance of distance to frontier, as captured by the
term A¯t−1/At−1. When this term is large, the country is far from the world
technology frontier and the major source of growth is the adoption of already well-
established technologies, as captured by the ηA¯t−1/At−1 term. When A¯t−1/At−1
becomes close to unity, so that the country is close to the frontier, innovation
matters relatively more and growth is driven by the γt (ν) term. Consequently,
as the country develops and approaches the world technology frontier, innovation
and entrepreneurial selection become more important.
For simplicity, we assume that γt (ν) = 0 for a low-skill entrepreneur and
denote the productivity of a high-skill entrepreneur by γt (ν) = γ > 0. To
guarantee a decreasing speed of convergence to the world technology frontier, we
also assume that λγ < 1 (recall that, λ is the fraction of high-skill agents in the
population).
Finally, the cost of investment for the small and large projects is, respectively,
kt (ν | s) =
{
φκA¯t−1 if s = σ,
κA¯t−1 if s = 1,
(10)
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where φ ∈ (0, 1). The assumption that investment cost is proportional to A¯t−1 en-
sures balanced growth.7 Intuitively, an important component of entrepreneurial
activity is to undertake imitation and adaptation of already existing technolo-
gies from the world frontier. As this frontier advances, entrepreneurs need to
incur greater costs to keep up with and make use of these technologies, hence
investment costs increase with A¯t−1.
3.3 C	
	, I	 P
,  C
	 C	
	
Capitalists have deep pockets (they can borrow from competitive intermediaries
at the exogenous interest rate r) and make contract oﬀers to a subset of workers
to become entrepreneurs, specifying the loan amount from intermediaries, as well
as payments to entrepreneurs and the level of investment. Investment costs are
ﬁnanced either through the retained earnings of entrepreneurs or by capitalists.
To simplify the discussion, we also assume that young capitalists (new ﬁrms)
cannot hire old entrepreneurs (e.g., because old cohort skills are not adaptable to
the new vintage of technologies); thus a new ﬁrm (young capitalist) necessarily
employs a young entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs engaged in innovative activities or even simply entrusted with
managing ﬁrms, are diﬃcult to monitor. This creates a standard moral hazard
problem, which we formulate in the simplest possible way: we assume that an
7Alternatively, investment costs of the form k
t
(ν) = κA¯ρ
t−1
A1−ρ
t−1
for any ρ ∈ [0, 1] would
ensure balanced growth. We choose the formulation in the text with ρ = 1 because it simpliﬁes
some of the expressions, without aﬀecting any of our major results. See the NBER Working
Paper version of this paper (Acemoglu et al. 2002) for the expressions when ρ < 1.
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entrepreneur can divert a fraction µ of the returns for his own use and will never
be prosecuted. The parameter µ measures the extent of the incentive problems,
or equivalently, the severity of the credit-market imperfections resulting from
these incentive problems. Moral hazard plays two important roles in our model:
ﬁrst, it creates credit constraints and so restricts investment, especially for young
entrepreneurs who do not have any retained earnings; second, via this channel,
it enables the retained earnings of old entrepreneurs (or, equivalently, the cash
in the hands of existing businesses) to shield them against the threat of entry by
new entrepreneurs.
To specify the incentive compatibility constraints more formally, deﬁne
πt(ν | s, e, z) as the ex post cash ﬂow generated by ﬁrm ν at date t as a function
of the size of the project, s ∈ {σ, 1}, and of the entrepreneur’s age, e ∈ {Y,O}
and skill level, z ∈ {L,H}; here Y denotes young, O old, L low skill, and H
high skill. Observe that πt(ν | s, e, z) is simply given by the expression in (3)
with At (ν) substituted from (8) as a function of s, e and z. For the entrepreneur
not to divert revenues, the following incentive compatibility constraint must be
satisﬁed:8
St (ν | s, e, z)− µπt (ν | s, e, z) ≥ 0, (11)
where St(ν | s, e, z) is the payment to an entrepreneur of age e and skill z who is
8This speciﬁcation rules out long-term contracts where the payment to an old entrepreneur
is conditioned on whether or not he has diverted funds in the ﬁrst period. Such long-term
contracts would require a commitment technology on the part of capitalists, which we assume is
not present in this economy. Introducing credible long-term contracts does not aﬀect the main
results of the analysis.
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running a project of size s. Thus, incentive compatibility requires the manager
to be paid a certain fraction of the ex post proﬁts.
Let us deﬁne R̂Et(ν | s, e, z) ≤ kt(ν | s) as the retained earnings injected by an
entrepreneur to ﬁnance part of the investment costs and deﬁne REt(ν | s, e, z) as
total retained earnings.9 Naturally we have 0 ≤ R̂Et(ν | s, e, z) ≤ REt(ν | s, e, z)
and, since young entrepreneurs have no funds to contribute, R̂Et(ν | s, e =
Y, z) = 0. Let us next deﬁne
Vt (ν | s, e, z) = πt (ν | s, e, z)− St (ν | s, e, z)−
(
kt (ν | s)− R̂Et (ν | s, e, z)
)
(12)
as the value of a capitalist with a project of size s run by an entrepreneur of age
e and skill z, and deﬁne
s∗ (e, z) ∈ argmax
s
EtVt (ν | s, e, z) (13)
as the proﬁt-maximizing project size choice for capitalists given entrepreneur of
age e and of skill z, where Et is the expectations operator at time t (this applies
in the case of young entrepreneurs whose skills are yet unknown).
Capitalists maximize their expected returns as given in (12) subject to the
incentive compatibility constraints in (11) and a set of participation constraints
for the entrepreneurs. These participation constraints are given in Appendix A,
where we also show that, as long as σ < 1/(1 + r) and N is suﬃciently large,
9This inequality implies that side payments from entrepreneurs to capitalists are not possible.
This assumption can be motivated by various arguments. For example, ﬁrms may be unable to
commit to employ an entrepreneur after receiving the side payment (note that, provided a new
entrepreneur must incur the investment cost again, this commitment problem would not rule
out the use of retained earnings to ﬁnance part of the investment costs).
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all of the participation constraints are slack even if entrepreneurs inject all of
their retained earnings to ﬁnance part of the cost of investment. In the text, we
therefore ignore these constraints.
Finally, let us denote the maximized value of the capitalists by
EtV
∗
t (e, z) = EtVt (ν | s
∗ (e, z) , e, z) , (14)
with managerial payments St (ν | s, e, z) satisfying the incentive compatibility
constraints in (11).
Since the participation constraint is slack, there will be an excess supply of
young agents willing to become entrepreneurs. Hence young entrepreneurs will
be paid the lowest salary consistent with incentive compatibility, (11). The same
holds for old low-skill entrepreneurs (since these entrepreneurs cannot work in
young ﬁrms, old capitalists will make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to them, forcing
them down to their incentive compatibility constraint).10 But there will typically
be an excess demand for old entrepreneurs who are revealed to be high skill.
Competition between old capitalists then implies that11
V ∗t (e = O, z = H) ≤ max[V
∗
t (e = O, z = L) , EtV
∗
t (e = Y )]. (15)
Suppose this condition did not hold. Then an old capitalist currently working
with either an old low-skill entrepreneur or a young entrepreneur could deviate
10 If young ﬁrms could also hire old entrepreneurs, competition between young and old ﬁrms
would generate rents for old low-skill entrepreneurs. This would complicate the expressions,
without aﬀecting any of the qualitative results.
11With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the expected value of the ﬁrm with a young
entrepreneur E
t
V ∗
t
(e = Y ) (i.e., we omit the argument z). Similarly, we denote the optimal
size of a ﬁrm with a young entrepreneur by s∗
t
(e = Y ).
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oﬀering a higher salary to attract an old high-skill entrepreneur and thus increase
his proﬁts. To rule out such deviations, (15) must hold.
4 Euscusc
4.1 D	  Eusc
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To deﬁne an equilibrium, let us ﬁrst introduce the notation
at ≡
At
A¯t
(16)
as proximity to frontier, an inverse measure of the country’s distance to frontier.
This variable will summarize the state of the economy.
The key decisions in this economy are the level of investment (project size)
with various types of entrepreneurs and whether to terminate an entrepreneur
and replace him with a new one. It is clear that high-skill entrepreneurs will
always be retained, so the crucial choice is whether a low-skill entrepreneur will
be retained or not. We denote the retention decision by Rt (ν) ∈ {0, 1}, with
Rt = 0 corresponding to termination and Rt = 1 corresponding to retention.
A static equilibrium (given the state at of the economy) is then a set of
intermediate good prices, pt(ν), that satisfy (2), proﬁt levels given by (3), a wage
rate wt given by (5), project size choices s
∗(e, z) given by (13), and a continuation
decision with low-skill entrepreneurs Rt, such that
Rt =
{
0 if EtV
∗
t (e = Y ) ≥ V
∗
t (e = O, z = L) ,
1 if EtV
∗
t (e = Y ) < V
∗
t (e = O, z = L) .
A dynamic equilibrium is obtained by piecing together static equilibria as
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deﬁned in this section through the law of motion of aggregate productivity as
given by (9). We provide the equilibrium law of motion in greater detail below.
4.2 Eusc
usc I		  R 
In this section we characterize the equilibrium investment (project size) and re-
ﬁnancing decisions. Even when, absent moral hazard, it would be proﬁtable for
ﬁrms to pay the investment cost and operate the large project, credit-market
imperfections and moral hazard can lead to underinvestment in equilibrium (i.e.,
ﬁrms may run small projects even though large projects are socially more ef-
ﬁcient). To understand why, note that because of the incentive compatibility
constraint (11) proﬁts must be shared between the capitalist and the entrepre-
neur, with respective shares 1− µ and µ, after production is realized. Entrepre-
neurs, however, are credit constrained, and this forces capitalists to bear the bulk
(sometimes the whole) of the investment cost, although they appropriate only a
fraction 1− µ of the returns. Hence, underinvestment can occur in equilibrium.
The underinvestment problem tends to be more severe when ﬁrms hire young
entrepreneurs who have no wealth and so force capitalists to bear the entire
investment cost. Old entrepreneurs, in contrast, can bear part of the cost by
injecting their retained earnings. To see why, consider the extreme case in which
an old entrepreneur is willing to cover the entire investment cost out of his re-
tained earnings. Then the ﬁrm will necessarily prefer to operate the large project
with this entrepreneur, and there will be no underinvestment. This example il-
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lustrates why retained earnings mitigate the underinvestment problem but also
reduces selection by making old low-skill entrepreneurs more attractive to ﬁrms.
Although diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations are possible, we now restrict
attention to the region of the parameter space where the trade-oﬀ emphasized
in this paper emerges more clearly: reﬁnancing an old entrepreneur who has
proven to be of low skill may be proﬁtable because it mitigates the credit-market
imperfection.
Lemma 1 Let
δL ≡
κ
N
1
(1− µ) (1− σ) η + 1+r1+gµση
,
δH ≡
κ
N
1− φ
(1− µ) (1− σ) (η + λγ)
,
and suppose that δ ∈ (δL, δH). Then, for all a ∈ [0, 1], the following
statements hold:
1. Young entrepreneurs operate small projects (i.e.,
s∗t (e = Y ) = σ).
2. If an old low-skill entrepreneur is retained (i.e., Rt = 1), then he
operates a large project (i.e., s∗t (e = O, z = L) = 1) and contributes
to his entire retained earnings,
REt =
1+ r
1 + g
σµδNηA¯t−1, (17)
to ﬁnance of the project.
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3. All high-skill entrepreneurs are always retained and operate large projects,
that is, s∗t (e = O, z = H) = 1.
This lemma is proved in Appendix B, where we also show that δL < δH for all
φ < φ¯, so that the interval (δL, δH) is nonempty. The assumption that φ is suf-
ﬁciently low ensures that capital market imperfections, rather than productivity
diﬀerences, are the main determinant of the ﬁrm’s decision on project size.
Lemma 1 establishes that, for a non empty range of competition policies
δ ∈ (δL, δH) , if a low-skill entrepreneur is retained, then he must run a large
project. In the rest of the paper, we restrict our attention to this range.12 Note
also that the expression for REt follows immediately, since the entrepreneur in
question is low-skill and operated a small project in his youth.
When does the ﬁrm prefer to retain a low-skill old entrepreneur rather than
hire a young entrepreneur? Consider the value of a ﬁrm that retains an old
low-skill entrepreneur and operates the large project:
Vt (ν | s = 1, e = O, z = L) = ((1− µ) δNηA¯t−1 −max[κA¯t−1 −REt, 0]), (18)
where REt is given by (17).
To simplify the discussion, we wish to ensure that κA¯t−1 > REt, so that
the cost of the large project is greater than retained earnings (see the NBER
Working Paper version for the analysis when this assumption is relaxed and so the
12The analysis can be easily extended to the case where δ /∈ (δ
L
, δ
H
). If δ < δ
L
, old low-skill
entrepreneurs, if retained, are assigned to small projects that they partially or totally ﬁnance
through retained earnings. In this case, there is no trade-oﬀ between selection and investment
size. On the other hand, if δ > δ
H
, young entrepreneurs operate large projects, and once again
there is no trade-oﬀ.
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entrepreneur ﬁnances the entire cost of the project). The following assumption
is suﬃcient to ensure that this will be the case for all δ ∈ (δL, δH):
Assumption 1 We assume that δH < κ/(σµηN(1 + r)/(1 + g)).
Under this assumption, the term max[κA¯t−1 −REt, 0] in the right hand-side
of (18) simpliﬁes to κA¯t−1 for all δ ∈ (δL, δH).
In contrast, the value of the ﬁrm that hires a young entrepreneur and runs a
small project is
EtVt (ν | s = σ, e = Y ) = (1− µ) δNσ (η + λγat−1) A¯t−1 − φκA¯t−1. (19)
The ﬁrm retains low-skill old entrepreneurs whenever
Vt (ν | s = 1, e = O, z = L) > EtVt (ν | s = σ, e = Y ) , (20)
where the left-hand side is given by (18) and the right-hand side by (19). If con-
dition (20) does not hold, then low-skill entrepreneurs are terminated. Condition
(20) deﬁnes a threshold level ar(µ, δ) of the distance to frontier such thatlow-skill
old entrepreneurs are retained (R = 1) below this threshold but are terminated
(R = 0) above this threshold.
Using (18) and (19), we obtain this threshold as:
ar (µ, δ) ≡
(
(1− µ) (1− σ) + 1+r1+gµσ
)
η − κ(1−φ)δN
(1− µ)σλγ
. (21)
The threshold ar(µ, δ) is increasing in δ: when product markets are less com-
petitive (higher δ), the switch to R = 0 occurs later. This comparative sta-
tic reﬂects two forces. The ﬁrst is the appropriability eﬀect, which (as already
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pointed out) implies that ﬁrms do not capture the entire surplus created by tech-
nological progress. Capitalists bear the costs of investment but, because of the
appropriability eﬀect, obtain only a fraction of the returns. Consequently they
have a bias against retaining old entrepreneurs which is associated with greater
investment expenditures. A higher δ weakens the extent of this appropriability
eﬀect and enables ﬁrms, and hence capitalists, to capture more of the surplus
and so encouraging the retention of old entrepreneurs. Second, as shown by (17),
a higher δ implies greater proﬁts and greater retained earnings for old entrepre-
neurs, which they can use to shield themselves against competition from young
entrepreneurs, making their own retention more likely.
However, the eﬀect of incentive problems µ, on ar (µ, δ) is ambiguous. On the
one hand, a higher µ increases the earnings retained by entrepreneurs and raises
these insiders’ shields against competition from newcomers, encouraging R = 1.
On the other hand, a higher µ reduces the proﬁt diﬀerential between hiring a
young versus an old low-skill entrepreneur. If
δ >
(1− φ)κ
σηL
1 + g
1 + r
(22)
then the former eﬀect dominates and ar is increasing in µ, so that more severe
moral hazard problems encourage R = 1. In contrast, when (22) does not hold,
these problems encourage the termination of low-skill entrepreneurs.
The static equilibrium is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and δ ∈ (δL, δH), and let ar (µ, δ)
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be deﬁned by (21). Then, for given at−1, there exists a unique equilibrium
such that (i) young entrepreneurs operate small projects (s∗t (e = Y ) = σ); (ii)
old low-skill entrepreneur are retained (Rt = 1) and operate large projects
(s∗t (e = O, z = L) = 1) when at−1 < ar (µ, δ) but are terminated (Rt = 0) when
at−1 > ar (µ, δ); and (iii) old high-skill entrepreneurs are always retained and
operate large projects (s∗t (e = O, z = H) = 1) for all at−1 ∈ [0, 1]. The threshold
ar (µ, δ) is increasing in δ.
4.3 D Eusc
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We now characterize the dynamic equilibrium of the economy. Let us ﬁrst de-
termine the law of motion of at conditional on the retention decision Rt. We ob-
serve that half the ﬁrms are young and then use (4) to write At ≡
∫ 1
0 At(ν)dν =(
AYt +A
O
t
)
/2, where AYt is average productivity among young ﬁrms and A
O
t is
average productivity among old ﬁrms. In addition, since all young ﬁrms hire
young entrepreneurs (who, by Lemma 1, choose s = σ) and since a fraction λ of
those are high skill, it follows that AYt = σ(ηA¯t−1 + λγAt−1).
Average productivity among old ﬁrms depends on whether we have R = 1
or R = 0. With R = 1, all entrepreneurs are retained; a fraction λ are high
ability, and all old entrepreneurs choose s = 1, so AOt [R = 1] = ηA¯t−1+λγAt−1.
On the other hand, if R = 0 then only a fraction λ of the entrepreneurs (those
revealed to be of high skill) are retained, and the remaining 1 − λ are replaced
by young entrepreneurs. Hence, in this case AOt [R = 0] = λ(ηA¯t−1 + γAt−1)+
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(1− λ)σ(ηA¯t−1 + λγAt−1). Combining the deﬁnitions for A
Y
t , A
O
t and at (from
(16)) and using the fact that A¯t grows at the rate g, we obtain:
at =

1+σ
2(1+g) [η + λγat−1] if Rt = 1,
1
2(1+g) [(λ+ σ + (1− λ)σ) η + (1 + σ + (1− λ)σ)λγat−1] if Rt = 0.
(23)
This equation, which is also depicted in Figure 2, shows that the econ-
omy with Rt = 1 achieves greater growth (higher level of at for given at−1)
through the imitation/adoption channel, as captured by the fact that (1 + σ) η >
(λ+ σ + (1− λ)σ) η. However, it also achieves lower growth through the inno-
vation channel, since (1 + σ)λγat−1 < (1 + σ + (1− λ)σ)λγat−1. In light of
this observation, we can think of an equilibrium with Rt = 1 as corresponding
to an investment-based strategy, where ﬁrms undertake greater investments even
at the expense of sacriﬁcing entrepreneurial selection. This strategy involves
longer-term relationships (entrepreneurs are never terminated) and the protec-
tion of older entrepreneurs from the competition of younger ones. In contrast,
with Rt = 0 we can think of the economy as pursuing an innovation-based strat-
egy, where there is greater selection of entrepreneurs and where the emphasis
is on maximizing innovation at the expense of investment. Consequently, the
innovation-based strategy results in a more “competitive” environment in which
unsuccessful entrepreneurs are terminated and only successful entrepreneurs are
retained.
FIGURE 2
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The full equilibrium is then simply determined by combining this with the
equilibrium law of motion, (23), which, by Proposition 1, can be written as:
at =

1+σ
2(1+g) (η + λγat−1) if at−1 ≤ ar (µ, δ)
1
2(1+g)
(
(λ+ σ + (1− λ)σ) η
+(1 + σ + (1− λ)σ)λγat−1
)
if at−1 > ar (µ, δ)
. (24)
FIGURE 3
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium dynamics. As (24) shows, equilibrium dy-
namics are given by a piecewise linear ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation. When
at−1 ≤ ar (µ, δ), the economy pursues the investment-based strategy, but if at−1
exceeds ar (µ, δ), then the economy switches to the steeper line, which corre-
sponds to the innovation-based strategy.
The ﬁgure shows the possibility of a non convergence trap, where an econ-
omy stops converging to the frontier. To elaborate on this further, let us ﬁrst
characterize the world growth rate. It is plausible to assume that the growth
rate of the technology frontier is determined endogenously by the most advanced
economy in the world pursuing the innovation-based strategy. Then, equation
(24) evaluated at a = 1 gives the world technology growth rate as:
g =
1
2
[(λ+ σ + (1− λ)σ) η + (1 + σ + (1− λ)σ)λγ]− 1, (25)
which we assume to be positive. In addition, for the innovation-based strategy to
generate higher growth than the investment-based strategy at the frontier, a = 1,
we need
(1− σ) η
σ
< λγ. (26)
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Consequently, at a = 1, the R = 0 line intersects the 45-degree line and is
above the R = 1 line. But then, as drawn in Figure 3, the R = 1 line must
intersect the 45-degree line at some atrap < 1. From (23), this threshold value
can be calculated as
atrap =
(1 + σ) η
2 (1 + g)− λγ (1 + σ)
. (27)
If the economy is pursuing the investment-based strategy when it reaches a =
atrap, then it will stay there forever. In other words, it will have fallen into a non
convergence trap.
In practice, however, an economy may switch out of the investment-based
strategy before atrap is reached. Therefore, the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for an equilibrium non convergence trap is
atrap < ar (µ, δ) ,
which corresponds to the case depicted in Figure 3. In contrast, Figure 4 shows
the case where atrap > ar (µ, δ); here the economy switches out of the investment-
based strategy before atrap is reached, and the non convergence trap does not
arise.
FIGURE 4
When is this condition likely to be satisﬁed? From (27), atrap is an increasing
function of λγ and is independent of κ/δN and µ. Since ar (µ, δ) is a decreasing
function of κ/δN and of λγ, smaller values of κ/δN and λγ make it more likely
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that atrap < ar (µ, δ). Furthermore, if condition (22) holds, then traps are more
likely in economies with severe incentive problems/credit market imperfections.
These comparative statics are intuitive. First, smaller values of κ and greater
values of δN make the retention of low-skill entrepreneurs more likely. Since a
trap can only arise due to excess retention, a greater κ/δN reduces the likelihood
of traps. Second, large values of λγ increase the opportunity cost of employing
low-skill entrepreneurs, and make it less likely that a trap can emerge due to
lack of selection. Finally, when condition (22) holds, more severe credit market
imperfections (incentive problems) favor insiders by raising retained earnings and
increase the likelihood of a non convergence trap.
The next proposition summarizes the equilibrium dynamics:
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and δ ∈ (δL, δH). Let ar (µ, δ) and
atrap be deﬁned by (21) and (27), and denote the initial distance to frontier by
a0. Then the unique dynamic equilibrium is as follows:
1. If a0 < ar (µ, δ) and atrap ≥ ar (µ, δ), then the economy starts with the
investment-based strategy, switches to the innovation-based strategy at
a = ar (µ, δ), and converges to the world technology frontier, a = 1.
2. If a0 < ar (µ, δ) and atrap < ar (µ, δ), then the economy starts with the
investment-based strategy and converges towards the world technology fron-
tier until it reaches a = atrap < 1, where both convergence and the growth
of at stop.
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3. If ar (µ, δ) ≤ a0, then the economy starts with the innovation-based strategy
and converges to the world technology frontier, a = 1.
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In this section, we analyze the growth implications of diﬀerent development
strategies. We ﬁrst characterize the growth-maximizing strategy. Clearly, growth
maximization is not the correct criterion for welfare comparisons, since it ignores
the cost of investments. Nevertheless, it is the most appropriate way to derive
implications of the theory that are comparable with the evidence presented in
Section 2. In Appendix C, we characterize the welfare-maximizing strategies
and show that the comparison of those to the equilibrium is very similar to the
comparison of the growth-maximizing strategy to the equilibrium.
Inspection of (23) or of Figure 2 immediately shows that growth will be
maximized when the economy reaches the highest level of at for a given at−1.
This is attained by pursuing the strategy of R = 1 whenever at−1 < aˆ and
pursuing the innovation-based strategy, R = 0, whenever at−1 > aˆ, where aˆ is
given by the intersection of the R = 0 and R = 1 lines in Figure 4 or by
aˆ ≡
η (1− σ)
λγσ
. (28)
Condition (26) ensures that aˆ < 1. Therefore, similar to the case of equilibrium
behavior, the growth-maximizing sequence also starts with the investment-based
strategy and then switches to an innovation-based strategy. But the switch does
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not necessarily occur at the same point as in the equilibrium case.
How does aˆ compare to the equilibrium threshold ar (µ, δ)? The answer de-
pends on (among other things) the degree of competition as measured by δ. The
appropriability eﬀect discussed previously means that equilibrium behavior is bi-
ased against the investment-based strategy, creating a force toward ar (µ, δ) < aˆ.
However, countering this is the rent-shield eﬀect: retained earnings are used
to ﬁnance part of the investment costs, creating a transfer to the capitalists
and shielding old entrepreneurs from the competition of young entrepreneurs.
In other words, while the appropriability eﬀect creates a bias (relative to the
growth-maximizing allocation) against the investment-based strategy, retained
earnings (rents) of the insiders protect them from competition and create a bias
in favor of the investment-based strategy.
Which eﬀect dominates is ambiguous. A greater δ increases ar (µ, δ) relative
to aˆ (which does not depend on δ), but this could either increase or decrease the
gap between the equilibrium and the growth-maximizing allocations depending
on whether we start from a situation where aˆ > ar (µ, δ) or aˆ < ar (µ, δ), respec-
tively. Given µ, there exists a unique level of competition δ, denoted by δ̂ (µ), such
that
aˆ = ar
(
µ, δ̂ (µ)
)
, where13
δ̂ (µ) =
κ
N
1− φ
1+r
1+gµση
.
13Note that δ̂ (µ) > δ
L
. Moreover, if (1− µ) (1− σ) (η + λγ) > (1 + r)µση/ (1 + g) then
δ̂ (µ) < δ
H
, so the restriction δ ∈ (δ
L
, δ
H
) in Lemma 1 does not preclude the possibility that
changes in δ can either augment or reduce growth.
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If δ > δ̂ (µ) , i.e., product market competition is low, then aˆ < ar (µ, δ) and
there is an excessive retention of low-skill entrepreneurs relative to the growth-
maximizing allocation. In this case, which is the one shown in Figure 3, limiting
competition (i.e., increase δ) would further increase the growth gap between
the equilibrium and the growth-maximizing strategy. Conversely, if δ < δ̂ (µ) ,
i.e., product market competition is high, then aˆ > ar (µ, δ) as shown in Figure
4. In this case, the economy switches out of the investment-based strategy too
quickly, and limiting competition would increase growth in the range where at ∈
(ar (µ, δ) , aˆ).
One implication of the foregoing discussion is that less competitive environ-
ments may foster growth at early stages of development (far from the technology
frontier). For example, starting with an economy featuring aˆ > ar (µ, δ) and
at−1 ∈ (ar (µ, δ) , aˆ), an increase in δ (a reduction in competition) may induce the
investment-based strategy in this range and secure more rapid growth. However,
our previous discussion of non convergence traps also underscored that limiting
product market competition may later become harmful to growth, preventing
convergence to the frontier. In particular, there exists a threshold competition
level δ∗(µ), deﬁned by
ar (µ, δ
∗ (µ)) = atrap, (29)
such that an economy with δ < δ∗(µ) will never fall into a non convergence trap.
Therefore, competitive markets may slow down technological convergence at the
earlier stages of development, but this does not aﬀect the long-run equilibrium.
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Low competition, on the other hand, may have detrimental eﬀects in the long-run.
Our analysis thus leads to a new theory of “leapfrogging”. Imagine two
economies that start with the same distance to frontier, at−1, but diﬀer in terms
of their competitive policies, δ1 and δ2, with ar (µ, δ1) < at−1 < aˆ < ar (µ, δ2).
Given this conﬁguration, economy 1 will pursue the innovation-based strategy,
while economy 2 will start with the investment-based strategy and initially grows
faster than economy 1. However, once these economies pass beyond aˆ, economy
1 starts growing more rapidly, because economy 2 still pursues the investment-
based strategy (despite the fact that growth is now maximized via the innovation-
based strategy). Furthermore, if atrap < ar (µ, δ2), then economy 2 will get stuck
in a non convergence trap before it can switch to the innovation-based strategy,
and will be leapfrogged by economy 1, which avoids the non convergence trap
and converges to the frontier. This result further illustrates the claim made in
the Introduction that those rigid institutions associated with the less competitive
market structures supporting the investment-based strategy become more costly
as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. It may also shed some
light on why some economies (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Peru) that initially grew rela-
tively rapidly with highly protectionist policies were then overtaken by economies
(e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore), with more competitive policies.14
14Before 1967, the growth of GDP per worker was indeed slower in Singapore (2.6% per year)
than in both Mexico (3.9%) and Peru (5.3%). This ranking reversed in the 1970s and 1980s.
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The analysis so far has established a number of results. First, the dynamic
equilibrium typically starts with the investment-based regime, which features
high investment and long-term relationships. As the economy approaches the
world technology frontier, this is followed by a switch to an innovation-based
regime featuring lower investment, younger ﬁrms and more selection. Second, if
there is no switch to the innovation-based regime, the economy will get stuck in
a non convergence trap and will not converge to the frontier. Finally, for some
parameter values far from the world technology frontier, the growth rate can be
increased by inducing the economy to stay longer in the investment-based regime.
This last observation raises the possibility of useful policy interventions along
the lines suggested by Gerschenkron: governments in relatively backward economies
can intervene to increase investment and to induce faster adoption of existing
technologies. However, the second observation points out that this type of inter-
vention may have long-run costs unless it is abandoned at later stages of develop-
ment. In this section, we start with a brief discussion of possible policies to foster
growth, which can be interpreted as corresponding to “appropriate” institutions
for countries at diﬀerent stages of development (in the sense that they are useful
only at speciﬁc stages of development).
Consider an equilibrium allocation with ar (µ, δ) < aˆ, where the economy
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switches out of the investment-based strategy before the growth-maximizing
threshold. A policy intervention that encourages greater investment will increase
growth over the range a ∈ (ar (µ, δ) , aˆ).
15 A number of diﬀerent policies can
be used for this purpose. Probably the most straightforward is an investment
subsidy, which might take the form of direct subsidies or preferential loans at low
interest rates. Suppose the government subsidizes a fraction τ of the cost of in-
vestment. Analyzing as before, we analogously derive the threshold for switching
from the investment- to the innovation-based strategy:
a˜r (µ, δ, τ) ≡
(
(1− µ) (1− σ) + 1+r1+gµσ
)
η − (1−φ)κ(1−τ)δN
(1− µ)σλγ
.
If τ is chosen appropriately in particular, if τ = τ˜ such that a˜r (µ, δ, τ˜) = aˆ
then the economy can be induced to switch out of the investment-based strategy
exactly at aˆ (or at some other desired threshold, if the government is pursuing a
diﬀerent objective).
Investment subsidies are diﬃcult to implement, however, especially in rela-
tively backward economies where tax revenues are scarce. Furthermore, it may
be diﬃcult for the government to observe and monitor the exact level of invest-
ment undertaken by ﬁrms. For this reason, we focus on another potential policy
instrument that aﬀects the equilibrium threshold ar (µ, δ): the extent of such an-
ticompetitive policies as entry barriers, merger policies and so forth. Naturally,
this discussion also applies to investment subsidies.
15The analysis in Appendix C also shows that, with µ or δ suﬃciently small, we can also have
a
r
(µ, δ) less than the threshold at which a welfare-maximizing social planner would choose to
switch from the investment- to the innovation-based strategy, so this discussion could be carried
out in terms of policies to encourage welfare (rather than growth) maximization.
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Anticompetitive policies are captured by the parameter χ in our model. We
recall that δ is monotonically increasing in χ, so high values of χ or δ correspond
to a less competitive environment. Starting from a situation where ar (µ, δ) < aˆ,
anticompetitive policies close the gap between the equilibrium threshold and the
growth-maximizing threshold. Although restricting competition creates static
losses (recall equation (6)), in the absence of feasible tax/subsidy policies this
may be the best option available to encourage faster growth and technological
convergence.
When the government chooses a less competitive environment in a backward
economy in order to encourage long-term relationships, greater investment, and
faster technological convergence the situation is reminiscent of Gerschenkron’s
analysis. It is also related to the well-known “infant industry” arguments calling
for protection and government support for certain industries at early stages of
their development. But our analysis also reveals that anticompetitive policies
(and similarly investment subsidies) become harmful for economies closer to the
world technology frontier. Institutions that are appropriate for early stages of
development therefore become inappropriate for an economy close to the frontier.
An economy that adopts such institutions must later abandon them; otherwise,
it will end up in a non convergence trap.
Yet a sequence of policies whereby certain interventions are ﬁrst adopted and
then abandoned does raise important political economy considerations. Groups
that beneﬁt from anticompetitive policies will become richer under these policies
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and so will oppose a change in policy. To the extent that economic power buys
political power, say, via lobbying, these groups can be quite inﬂuential in opposing
such changes. Therefore, the introduction of appropriate institutions to foster
growth also raises the possibility of political economy traps: groups enriched
by these institutions successfully block reform, and the economy ends up in a
non convergence trap because it adopted but could not abandon institutions
appropriate for an early stage of development. This is the subject of the following
section.
5.2 P	   	
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We now describe a simple political economy example where special interest groups
may capture politicians and lead the economy into a “political economy trap”.
Our example is a much-simpliﬁed version of the special interest group model
of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), extended to include a link between
economic power and political inﬂuence (on this, see also Do 2002).16
Suppose that competition policy χ is determined in each period by a politician
(or government) that cares about the agents’ welfare but is also sensitive to
bribes or to campaign contributions. For tractability, we adopt a simple setup:
the politician at time t can be bribed to aﬀect policies at time t + 1. The
politician’s pay-oﬀ is equal to HAt−1 (where H > 0) if she behaves honestly
16We limit our analysis to a particular case where the equilibrium sequence illustrates the
possibility of political economy traps. Details and the more comprehensive analysis are in the
NBER Working Paper version of this paper.
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and chooses the policy that maximizes current consumption. Else, his pay-oﬀ is
Bt, where B denotes a monetary bribe the politician might receive in order to
pursue a diﬀerent strategy. The utility of pursuing the right policy is assumed
to be linearly increasing in At−1, which ensures stationary policies in equilibrium
(since bribes will be increasing in A).17
We assume that agents cannot borrow to pay bribes and that only capitalists
can organize lobbies. Moreover, young agents have no wealth, so they cannot
bribe politicians. Hence the only group with the capability to bribe politicians
is old capitalists. We also assume that the institutional choice facing politicians
is binary: low versus high competition.
More formally, politicians choose χt ∈
{
χ, χ¯
}
where χ < χ¯ ≤ 1/α. By analogy,
we set δt ≡ (χt − 1)χ
−1/(1−α)
t ∈ {δ, δ}, which, we recall, is the parameter in
the proﬁt function, (3). The assumption that χ is a discrete rather than a
continuous choice variable is for simplicity. Since we want to emphasize the
possibility of traps induced by political economy factors, we choose δ and δ
such that δ∗ (µ) ∈
(
δ, δ
)
: hence an economy choosing δ forever converges to a
non convergence trap, whereas an economy choosing forever δ converges to the
frontier.
Clearly, capitalists always prefer low to high competition, since this increases
17 In this formulation the honesty parameter H can be interpreted as a measure of the ag-
gregate welfare concerns of politicians, or more interestingly, as the quality of the system of
checks and balances that limits the ability of special interest groups to capture politicians. This
formulation is similar to that in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001) but simpler since in their
model, the utility that the politician gets from adopting various policies is a continuous function
of the distance from the ideal policy. As in their setup, the politician can commit to deliver the
competition policy promised to an interest group in return for bribes.
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their proﬁts. Under some conditions, old capitalists will be willing to pay the
entire ﬁrst-period revenue to increase their monopoly power. We focus on pa-
rameter values where these conditions hold, so that capitalists are credit con-
strained.18 This implies that they will be able to bribe the politicians as long
as the maximum bribe they can pay which is given by their ﬁrst-period earnings
exceeds the cost of buying politics. Capitalists’ ﬁrst-period earnings, on the other
hand, depend on δt−1, the competition policy at t− 1. Therefore, capitalists will
successfully bribe politicians when
δt−1 (1− µ)σN (η + λγat−1) ≥ Hat−1, (30)
where the left-hand side is the ﬁrst-period earnings of capitalists and thus the
maximum bribes they can pay.
It is evident that when δt−1 is greater, (30) is more likely to hold; in less
competitive markets, capitalists have higher proﬁts that they can use for bribing
politicians. Let us deﬁne aL and aH as the unique values of at−1 such that (30)
holds with equality for δt−1 = δ and δt−1 = δ, respectively. Thus:
aL ≡
δ (1− µ)σNη
H − λγδ¯ (1− µ)σN
> aH ≡
δ (1− µ)σNη
H − λγδ (1− µ)σN
. (31)
This discussion immediately implies that politicians will be bribed to maintain
the anticompetitive policy δ as long as at−1 ≤ aL, which ensures that the left-
18This is in the spirit of capturing the notion that economic and political power are related.
If capitalists were not credit constrained this link would be absent in our model. See the NBER
Working Paper for the conditions to ensure that capitalists are credit constrained. There, we
also discuss the case in which politicians may choose anticompetitive policies even without
bribes (since this would be the welfare-maximizing policy). Here, we focus on the case where
such range is empty and without bribes, the politician would always choose high competition.
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hand side of (30) is greater than the right-hand inside. Similarly, politicians will
be bribed to switch from a procompetitive policy δt−1 = δ to an anticompetitive
policy δ when at−1 ≤ aH . That aL > aH follows because capitalists make greater
proﬁts with low competition and have more funds to bribe politicians. This
formalizes the idea that, once capitalists become economically more powerful,
they also become politically more inﬂuential and consequently more likely to
secure the policy that they prefer. Note that both the cutoﬀs aL and aH are
decreasing functions of H, because politicians who are more honest will be harder
to bribe into pursuing the policy preferred by the capitalist lobby.
Finally, in order to focus on an interesting case, let us further assume that
atrap ∈ (aH , aL). In this case, the equilibrium sequence has the following features:
1. If a0 < aH then the economy starts at a point where the capitalists are
suﬃciently rich that, even when δt−1 = δ, they will have enough to bribe
politicians successfully. Consequently, as long as a < atrap there will be
growth with anticompetitive policies, but the economy will eventually con-
verge to the non convergence trap, atrap. We refer to this situation as a
political economy trap, because politicians, once in it, always receive bribes
and adopt policies that prevent a switch from the investment-based to the
innovation-based strategy.
2. If a0 > aL, then capitalists have insuﬃcient wealth to bribe politicians
even when δt−1 = δ. Hence, the policy is procompetitive and the economy
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switches to an innovation-based strategy and therefore converges to the
world technology frontier, a = 1.
3. Finally, if a0 ∈ (aH , aL), then the long-run outcome is history dependent.
If competition is initially low, δt−1 = δ, capitalists enjoy greater monopoly
proﬁts and are suﬃciently wealthy to lobby successfully to maintain the
anticompetitive policies (δt−1 = δ) in place; the equilibrium is identical
to case 1 and eventually ends up in a non convergence trap. However, if
competition is initially high (δt−1 = δ), capitalists make lower proﬁts and
do not have enough purchasing power to buy politicians. Consequently, in
this case, there is no eﬀective lobbying activity, procompetitive policies are
never abandoned, and the economy converges to a = 1.
In conclusion, when our theory is augmented with a stylized political process
describing the possible capture of politicians by lobbies, it predicts multiple
steady state political equilibria. One of these eventually leads to procompetitive
policies and an innovation-based equilibrium, ensuring convergence to the world
technology frontier; the other leads to a political economy trap, with investment-
based strategy throughout and no convergence to the frontier.
Two other points are noteworthy. First, since aH and aL are decreasing in
H, the analysis demonstrates that political economy traps are more likely when
there are fewer checks and balances on politicians. Second, it also suggests that
potentially well-meaning government policy directed at improving the short run
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allocation of resources (e.g., by encouraging the investment-based strategy) may
have unintended adverse long-run consequences.
6 Cusc
In this paper we have proposed a growth model where ﬁrms engage in copying and
adopting technologies from the world frontier and also in innovation activities.
The closer an economy is to the world technology frontier, the higher the relative
importance of innovation relative to imitation as a source of productivity growth.
Since the selection of high-skill entrepreneurs and ﬁrms is more important for in-
novation than for adoption, ﬁrms in countries that are far from the technology
frontier pursue an investment-based strategy, which features long-term relation-
ships, high average size and age of ﬁrms, large investments, but little selection.
Closer to the technology frontier, there is less room for copying and adoption
of well-established technologies; consequently, there is an equilibrium switch to
an innovation-based strategy with short-term relationships, younger ﬁrms, less
investment and better selection of entrepreneurs.
We showed that economies may switch out of the investment-based strat-
egy too soon or too late. A standard appropriability eﬀect, resulting from the
fact that ﬁrms do not internalize the greater consumer surplus they create by
investing more, implies that the switch tends to occur too soon. In contrast,
the presence of retained earnings that incumbent entrepreneurs can use to shield
themselves from competition makes the investment-based strategy persist for too
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long. When the switch is too soon, government intervention in the form of poli-
cies limiting product market competition or providing subsidies to investment
may be useful because it encourages the investment-based strategy. Neverthe-
less, anticompetitive policies can also lead to a non convergence trap whereby
the economy never switches out of the investment-based strategy and fails to
converge to the world technology frontier.
Even though much of the emphasis in this paper is on cross-country com-
parisons, the same reasoning also extends to cross-industry comparisons. In
particular, our analysis suggests that the organization of ﬁrms and of production
should be diﬀerent in industries that are closer to the world technology frontier.
More generally, cross-industry diﬀerences in the internal organization of the ﬁrm
constitute an interesting and relatively underexplored area for future research.
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In this appendix we prove that if σ < (1 + r)−1 (suﬃcient condition) and N is
suﬃciently large, then the incentive compatibility constraint (11) is always more
binding than the relevant participation constraints.
Let us denote ICt (ν | s, e, z) ≡ St (ν | s, e, z) − µπt (ν | s, e, z) ≥ 0, where
St (ν | s, e, z) is the payment to the entrepreneur and the inequality corresponds
to the incentive compatibility condition. The participation constraint for an old
entrepreneur is:
PCt (ν | s, e = O, z) ≡ St (ν | s, e = O, z)− R̂Et (ν | s, e = O, z)−wt ≥ 0, (32)
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which simply states that the payments minus retained earnings that are injected
must be greater than the wage rate. We will ensure that these participation
constraints hold even when all entrepreneurs inject all their retained earnings,
that is, when R̂Et (ν | s, e = O, z) = REt (ν | s, e = O, z).
The participation constraint for a young entrepreneur is slightly more in-
volved, since he anticipates potential rents if he remains an entrepreneur in the
future. We can write this constraint as
PCt (ν | s, e = Y ) ≡ St (ν | s, e = Y ) +
1
1 + r
EtRentt+1 −wt ≥ 0; (33)
here the expected future rent is given by
EtRentt+1 = λ PCt+1 (ν | s, e = O, z = H)+(1− λ) Rt PCt+1 (ν | s, e = O, z = L) ,
which uses the fact that future rents correspond to the future participation con-
straints being slack. This expression also takes into account that the entrepreneur
is uncertain about his own type and will receive future rents when he has high
skill or when he has low skill and the economy is in the investment-based regime
Rt = 1.
We prove the main result in two steps. First, we prove that there exists an
NY <∞ such that, for N ≥ NY , the participation constraint is slack for young
entrepreneurs. Second, we prove that there exists an NO < ∞ such that, for
N ≥ NO, the participation constraint is slack for both low- and high-skill old
entrepreneurs. Therefore, if N ≥ max {NY ,NOL, NOY }, then the participation
constraints both for young and old entrepreneurs are slack.
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For the ﬁrst step, observe that since the young have no retained earnings, a
suﬃcient condition for the participation constraint not to bind when the incentive
constraint binds is that µπt (ν | σ, Y, L) ≥ wt. Using equation (3) for equilibrium
proﬁts along with the equilibrium wage equation (5), we can re-express this
participation constraint (33) as
µδσN(ηA¯t−1 + λγAt−1) +
1
1 + r
EtRentt+1 ≥
(
(1− α)α−1χ−α/(1−α)
)
At. (34)
Since EtRent> 0 and At ≤ (1 + g) A¯t−1, a suﬃcient condition for (34) to hold
for all a is
N ≥
(1 + g) (1− α)α−1χ−α/(1−α)
µδση
≡ NY . (35)
To establish the second step, we note that the participation constraints of old
low-skill entrepreneurs is slack if and only if µπt (ν | 1, O,L)−REt (ν | 1, O,L) ≥
wt. Substituting for πt, wt and REt, we can re-express this condition as
µδN
(
ηA¯t−1 − (1 + r)σηA¯t−2
)
≥ (1− α)α−1χ−α/(1−α)At. (36)
Similarly, the participation constraints of old high-skill entrepreneurs is slack if
and only if µπt (ν | 1, O,H)−REt (ν | 1, O,H) ≥ wt. Substituting for πt, wt and
REt, we can re-express this condition as
µδN
((
ηA¯t−1 + λγAt−1
)
− (1 + r)σ
(
ηA¯t−2 + λγAt−2
))
≥ (1− α)α−1χ−
α
1−αAt
(37)
First, note that a suﬃcient condition for the LHS of both inequalities (36) and
(37) to be positive is that σ < 1/ (1 + r) (since A¯t−1 > A¯t−2 and At−1 > At−2,
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obviously ηA¯t−1 > ηA¯t−2 and ηA¯t−1 + λγAt−1 > ηA¯t−2 + λγAt−2). Second, as
long as σ < 1/ (1 + r) there exists an NO < ∞ such that, if N ≥ NO, then
both (36) and (37) hold, that is, the participation constraint is slack for both the
low-skill and high-skill old entrepreneurs.
Therefore, if N ≥ max {NY ,NO} then both participation constraints are
slack, even when entrepreneurs inject all their retained earnings.
A B: P  L
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Let
φ¯ ≡
1+r
1+gµση − (1− µ) (1− σ)λγ
1+r
1+gµση + (1− µ) (1− σ) η
. (38)
It is immediate to verify that if φ < φ¯ then δH > δN (in particular, note that δH
is decreasing in φ and that δH = δN if and only if φ = φ¯). We ﬁrst show that if
δ < δH then, for all a, young entrepreneurs are assigned to small projects. More
formally, δ < δH , implies that, for all a,
EtVt (ν | s = σ, e = Y ) = ((1− µ)σδN (η + λγat−1)− φκ) A¯t−1
≥ ((1− µ) δN (η + λγat−1)− κ) A¯t−1 = EtVt (ν | s = 1, e = Y ) .
Since the right-hand side increases in at−1 faster than the left-hand side, it suﬃces
to show this inequality for at−1 = 1. Letting
δ ≤
κ
N
1− φ
(1− µ) (1− σ) (η + λγ)
≡ δH ,
ensures that this is so.
51
Next we establish that the retained earnings of an old low-skill entrepreneur
at t are as given by (17). Recall ﬁrst that we have assumed participation con-
straints to be slack even when entrepreneurs inject all their retained earnings.
This, plus the fact that capitalists make the contract oﬀers, imply that old low-
skill entrepreneurs inject all their earnings, namely, R̂Et = REt (see Appendix
A). Retained earnings are therefore equal to the capitalized ﬁrst-period entrepre-
neurial earnings. We have shown above that all young entrepreneur run small
projects, so a low-skill entrepreneur born at t−1 will have a level of retained earn-
ings equal to µδσNηA¯t−2. Equation (7) implies that A¯t−1 = A¯t−2/ (1 + g), and
adding the interest payments at the rate r establishes that the retained earnings
of an old low-skill entrepreneurs at time t are as given by (17).
Now we show that, if δ > δL, then old entrepreneurs operate large projects.
We prove this true for a low-skill entrepreneur. Then, a fortiori, it must be
true for a high-skill entrepreneur. An old low-skill entrepreneur operates a large
project if and only if
Vt (ν | s = 1, e = O, z = L) =
(
(1− µ) δNη −max
[
κ−
1 + r
1 + g
µδNση, 0
])
A¯t−1
≥ Vt (ν | s = 1, e = O, z = L) =
(
(1− µ)σδNη −max
[
κ−
1 + r
1 + g
µδNση, 0
])
A¯t−1.
Hence,
(1− µ) (1− σ) δNη ≥ max
[
κ−
1 + r
1 + g
µδNση, 0
]
−max
[
φκ−
1 + r
1 + g
µδNση, 0
]
.
(39)
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We ﬁrst show that, if φ < φ¯ and δ ≥ δL, then φκ ≤ µδNση (1 + r) / (1 + g) . In
order to derive a contradiction, we suppose that φκ > µδNση (1 + r) / (1 + g)
for some δ ≥ δL. Let δ = δL. Then
φκ >
1 + r
1 + g
µδNNση =
1+r
1+gµση
(1− µ) (1− σ) η + 1+r1+gµση
κ > φ¯κ,
contradicting the assumption that φ < φ¯. Hence, we have established that
φκ ≤ µδLNση (1 + r) / (1 + g), which immediately implies that
φκ ≤ µδNση (1 + r) / (1 + g) for all δ ≥ δL. Thus, (39) can be rewritten as
(1− µ) (1− σ) δNη ≥ max
[
κ−
1 + r
1 + g
µδNση, 0
]
.
Since the left-hand side increases faster in δ than the right-hand side, ensuring
that this inequality holds for δ = δL is suﬃcient. Evaluating it at δ = δL yields:
(1− µ) (1− σ) η
(1− µ) (1− σ) η + 1+r1+gµση
κ ≥ max
[
(1− µ) (1− σ) η
(1− µ) (1− σ) η + 1+r1+gµση
κ, 0
]
,
which is obviously true. Hence, for all δ > δL we have
Vt (ν | s = 1, e = O, z = L) ≥ Vt (ν | s = σ, e = O, z = L) ,
and
Vt (ν | s = 1, e = O, z = H) ≥ Vt (ν | s = σ, e = O, z = H) ,
which concludes the proof of the lemma.
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In this appendix we compare the equilibrium with the retention policy that max-
imizes social welfare. Consider a planner who maximizes the present discounted
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value of the consumption stream with a discount factor β ≡ 1/ (1 + r); i.e., she
maximizes Ct +
∑
∞
j=1 β
tCt+j, where Ct = ζNAt −
∫ 1
0 kt (ν) dν is equal to net
output minus investment at date t, with
∫ 1
0 kt (ν) dν = κA¯t−1/2 if Rt = 1 and
equal to 0 if Rt = 0. As before, we start with an allocation where prices pt(ν)
satisfy (2) and the wage rate wt is given by (5), and we assume that Lemma 1
holds. The planner takes all decentralized decisions, including those regarding
project size, as given as in Section 4, and only chooses R.
A useful benchmark is the choice of a “myopic planner” who puts no weight
on future generations, (i.e., β = 0). The myopic planner chooses the retention
policy at t so as to maximize total consumption at t, and he retains old low-skill
entrepreneurs if and only if at−1 < amfb, where the threshold amfb is such that
Rt = 0 and Rt = 1 yield the same consumption, that is
amfb ≡
η (1− σ)− (1− φ)κ/ζN
σλγ
. (40)
This threshold can be compared with the growth-maximizing threshold. Since
the planner takes into account the cost of innovation, which is ignored by the
growth-maximizing strategy, the myopic planner sets amfb < aˆ.
Now consider a non-myopic planner who cares also about future consumption
(i.e., she has β > 0). She will realize that, by increasing the retention threshold on
amfb, she can increase future consumption at the expense of current consumption.
For any positive β and in particular for β = 1/ (1 + r), a small increase of the
threshold starting at amfb involves no ﬁrst-order loss in current consumption, but
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it generates ﬁrst-order gains in productivity (At) and in the present discounted
value of future consumption. The non-myopic planner will therefore choose a
threshold of afb > amfb. Moreover, we can see that afb cannot exceed the
growth-maximizing threshold aˆ. Any candidate threshold larger than aˆ (say,
a˜ > aˆ), can be improved upon, since any threshold in the range (a˜, aˆ] increases
both current and future consumption relative to a˜. Thus, the optimal threshold
cannot be to the right of aˆ. In summary, we have
amfb < afb < aˆ.
Therefore, an economy with suﬃciently high µ and δN will switch to an
innovation-based strategy too late, since it would feature ar (µ, δ) > aˆ. We can
also verify that an economy with suﬃciently small µ will switch to an innovation-
based strategy (Rt = 0) too soon relative to the welfare-maximizing allocation;
i.e., ar (µ, δ) < afb. To see this, note that for µ → 0, the expression of amfb
is identical to the expression of ar (µ, δ) (see equation (21)), except that here ζ
replaces δ in (21). However, because of the appropriability eﬀect, we have ζ > δ.
By continuity this implies that, for µ suﬃciently small, amfb > ar (µ, δ) and thus,
a fortiori, afb > ar (µ, δ).
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Table 1.
Innovation and distance to frontier.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to frontier 0.031 0.018 0.009 0.034 0.018 0.008
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dummies NO YES YES NO YES YES
Industry dummies NO YES YES NO YES YES
Country-industry dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES
Number of observations 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801
no correction for diff. in skills and hours correction for diff. in skills and hours
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the ratio of R&D over value added at the 2/3 digit level. The 
independent variable "Distance to frontier" is the inverse of TFP in each industry relative to frontier (see Griffith et al. 2004) and 
is defined as decreasing in the distance to frontier. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.033 and its standard deviation is 
0.045. The mean of the independent variable is 0.729 (0.705 in columns 4,5,6) and its standard deviation is 0.196 (0.203 in 
column 4,5,6).   
Table 2.
Growth, distance to frontier, and barriers to entry.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cross-section 
1965-95
High barriers (main effect) 0.040 0.039 0.021
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Low barriers (main effect) 0.036 0.029 0.011
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Distance to frontier * high barriers -0.078 -0.062 -0.072 -0.109 -0.214 -0.245
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.016) (0.047) (0.072) (0.080)
Distance to frontier * low barriers -0.028 0.009 -0.018 -0.039 -0.035 -0.046
(0.029) (0.017) (0.025) (0.037) (0.049) (0.052)
p -value difference interaction coeffs. 0.219 0.002 0.061 0.237 0.041 0.035
Dummy sub-saharan Africa YES YES YES NO NO NO
Time dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Control for education NO NO YES NO NO YES
Number of observations 43 300 262 300 290 255
R -squared 0.65 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.21 0.20
Distance to frontier (main effect) -0.016 -0.045 0.011 0.048 0.195 0.195
(0.055) (0.036) (0.047) (0.074) (0.105) (0.111)
Barriers (main effect) -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance to frontier * barriers -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.011 -0.030 -0.032
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Dummy sub-saharan Africa YES YES YES NO NO NO
Time dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Control for education NO NO YES NO NO YES
Number of Observations 43 300 262 300 290 255
R -Squared 0.52 0.29 0.29 0.46 0.17 0.14
In panel A, columns 5 and 6, the interactions between distance to frontier and the dummy for high- and low-barriers are 
instrumented using one-period lags of the same variables.  In panel B, columns 5 and 6, both the main effect of the distance to 
frontier and its interaction with barriers are instrumented using one-period lags of the same variables.  
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions in column 1 are cross-sectional with one observation per country, and the 
dependent variable is the annual average growth rate of GDP per worker (in PPP terms) over the period 1965-95. The remaining 
columns describe panel regressions, and the dependent variable is the average growth for five-years intervals, 1960-65, 1965-70,..., 
1990-95. The independent variable "Distance to frontier" is the ratio of the country's GDP per worker to the GDP per worker in the 
U.S., both calculated at the begining of each period. The independent variable "Barriers" in panel B is the "procedure measure", 
from Djankov et al. (2002), which measures the number of procedures necessary to open a business. The independent variable "High 
barriers" ("Low barriers") in panel A is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for countries with a number of procedures larger or 
equal to (smaller than) 11, and zero else. The control variable for education is the average years of schooling in the male population 
over 25 at the beginning of each period. 
Panel regression (5-year averages, 1960-95) 
Panel B: Dep. variable is growth rate of GDP per worker (annual avg.)
Panel A: Dep. variable is growth rate of GDP per worker (annual avg.)
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